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EXTERNALISM, INCLUSION, AND KNOWLEDGE OF CONTENT* 
Carlos J. Moya. University of Valencia 
In this paper I shall address the question whether self-knowledge is 
compatible with an externalist individuation of mental content. This 
question becomes pressing only in so far as self-knowledge is taken to 
be a genuine cognitive achievement. Not everybody accepts this. Some 
conceptions of self-knowledge interpret first-person statements about 
mental states as expressive, non-cognitive statements. Wittgensteinian 
approaches take this line. On this perspective, the privilege of the first-
person amounts to an entitlement to express mental states: linguistic 
statements replace more primitive, non- linguistic expressions . No 
cognitive achievement is involved here. Related positions view first-
person avowability as constitutive of the human mind itself. Against 
these approaches, I take self-knowledge to be a genuinely cognitive 
achievement: it is correct, I think, to say that we usually know what we 
currently want, believe or intend. Against a Cartesian perspective, self-
knowledge is neither incorrigible nor infallible. It is, however, direct, in 
the sense of non inferential, a priori, in the sense of not being based on 
empirical investigation of one's surroundings, and, in normal cases, 
presumptively true and endowed with prima facie special authority . 
Now the question is: Can we have self-knowledge, so understood, if we 
also accept externalism, i .e., if we accept that mental content is 
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constitutively determined by factors distinct from and external to the 
subject's brain or body? My answer to this question will be affirmative. 
There are, as far as I know, two main lines of attack to compatibility 
between self-knowledge and externalism. According to one of them, 
compatibilism entails that a subject can know, a priori, substantial 
truths about the external world.' The other line rests on the possibility 
of a subject's being unwittingly switched between worlds (cf. 
Boghossian 1989, 1992, 1994). In this paper I shall consider only the 
latter, though I think that my proposal could also be shown to be 
successful against the former. 2 The philosophical interest of the 
question addressed here lies m the fact that both externalism and self-
knowledge seem to be true and important doctrines about the human 
mind. Without externalism, we cannot make distinctions between 
thought contents (e.g., between water-thoughts and twater-thoughts) 
which are intuitively there, nor can we put forward certain intuitively 
correct semantic evaluations (e.g., that water-thoughts are false on 
Twin Earth). Besides, externalism contains the promise of a picture of 
the mind that could set us free from the traps of Cartesianism. Self-
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knowledge, in turn, is still more central to our conception of mentality. 
Lack of self-knowledge threatens responsible agency and critical 
rationality, as some authors have rightly stressed (cf. e.g. Bilgrami 
1992, pp. 250-1 and Burge 1996). So, it would certainly be good news 
if we could have both externalism and self-knowledge. Let us see 
whether we can. 
1 The original argument was first put forward in McKinsey 1991. See also Brown 
1995. The argument is given a new version in Boghossian 1997. For replies to 
Boghossian's version see my 1998 and Brown 1999. For recent discussions of this 
line of argument see Brueckner 2000 and Falvey 2000. 
2 As I try to argue in my 1998 paper. 
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1. The Simple Argument. 
At first sight, there is at least a tension between the thesis that 
content is determined by external factors on which a subject has no 
special cognitive authority and the thesis that a subject has a special 
cognitive authority over this content. This tension can be given 
expression in what I shall call "the simple argument". The argument can 
be put as follows: if the contents of one's thoughts depend on factors 
over which one has no direct, a priori, authoritative knowledge, one 
cannot have direct, a priori, authoritative knowledge over those 
contents themselves (first premise); but the antecedent of this 
conditional is true if externalism is true (second premise); so, if 
externalism is true, one cannot have self-knowledge (conclusion). This 
argument is implicit in many incompatibilist authors (cf. Woodfield 
1982, pp. vii-viii). But we can find it explicitly stated by Laurence 
Bonjour in a reference book, the Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. 
He writes: "An objection to externalise accounts of content is that they 
seem unable to do justice to our ability to know the contents of our 
beliefs or thoughts 'from the inside', simply by reflection. If content is 
dependent on external factors pertaining to the environment, then 
knowledge of content should depend on knowledge of those factors 
-which will not in general be available to the person whose belief or 
thought is in question." (Bonjour 1992, p. 136). That this text appears 
in this important reference book is a symptom that incompatibilism is 
gradually becoming the received opinion on this subject and that the 
simple argument for it seems convincing to many thinkers. 
And, nevertheless, the simple argument does not prove the 
incompatibility thesis, for, even if the argument is valid, its first 
premise is arguably false. To see this, think that there is a dependence 
4 
relation, maybe of a metaphysical character, between my existence and 
my parents' existence, so that I would not exist if my parents had not 
existed. However, I know that I exist in a direct, authoritative, a priori 
way, whereas my knowledge of my parents' existence is only empirical 
(cf. McKinsey 1991; see also Heil 1992, p. 163). By the way, this is why 
Descartes' argument from the certainty of the Cogito to the conclusion 
that the thinking self is independent of the body fails, as Arnauld 
already noticed (cf. Burge 1988, p. 651). It seems, then, that the first 
premise of the Simple Argument is false. At least, it cannot be true as a 
case of the general statement according to which if A depends upon B, 
one cannot have direct, a priori, authoritative knowledge of A if one 
does not have such a knowledge of B. The case of my parents' and my 
own existence is a counterexample to this statement. So, content might 
also be known in a direct, a priori, authoritative way even if it depends 
on external factors that cannot be known that way. If A depends upon 
B, it is not true, in general, that, in order to know A, I have first to 
know B. This holds as well when the dependence relation is 
constitutive or conceptual. There is such a relation between a certain 
figure's being a triangle and its internal angles' measuring 180 degrees. 
However, I can know in a direct, authoritative way that a certain figure 
is a triangle without knowing that its internal angles measure 180 
degrees. We can conclude, then, that the simple argument does not 
prove that self-knowledge and externalism are incompatible. 
Incompatibilists must work harder in order to substantiate their claim. 
2. The Inclusion Model. 
The fai lure of the Simple Argument does not dispel the feeling 
that there is a conflict or tension between self-knowledge and 
externalism. A positive account of how they are compatible would be 
welcome. The most widely accepted compatibilist account of self-
knowledge is what Sven Bernecker has called "the inclusion theory of 
self-knowledge" (Bernecker 1996, p. 265) and I would prefer to call 
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"the inclusion model" of self-knowledge. Advocates of this model 
include Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson and John Heil, among others.3 As 
Sanford C. Goldberg has pointed out, this proposal exploits the fact that 
the same form of words used to express a thought (e. g. "it's raining") 
is also used to self-ascribe the thought (e. g. "I think: it's raining") 
(Goldberg 1997, pp. 211-212). The central idea of this model is that 
reflective awareness of a first-order thought (say, a reflective judgment 
that one has a certain thought) inherits or includes (whence the label 
"inclusion model") the content of the first-order thought itself. Burge 
writes: " ... Knowledge [of one's own mental events] consists in a 
reflexive judgment which involves thinking a first-order thought that 
the judgment itself is about. The reflexive judgment simply inherits the 
content of the first-order thought." (Burge 1988, p. 656; cf. also Heil 
1988, p. 246 and 1992, eh. 5). On an externalist perspective, the 
individuation conditions of certain thoughts are partly external to the 
thinker; they consist in certain links with some aspects of the 
environment or with a social linguistic community to which the thinker 
defers. These conditions enable me to have a thought with a certain 
content, even if I do not know or believe that these conditions obtain 
or even what they are. Now, when I reflexively ascribe that thought to 
myself, the content of this thought is simply included in my reflexive 
3 For a recenl defence of a refined version of this model see Gibbons 1996. 
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awareness, and the external conditions that partly determine the 
content of the first-order thought also contribute to determining the 
content of the reflexive or second-order thought. As Davidson points 
out: "Showing that there is no conflict [between externalism and 
knowledge of content] is basically simple. It depends on realizing that 
whatever is responsible for the contents of our thoughts, whether 
known or not, is also responsible for the content of the thought that we 
have the thought" (Davidson, unpubl. ms, p. 35). The inclusion model 
ensures that Cogito-like judgments are contextually self-verifying. 
Suppose, in effect, that external conditions partly determine, for the 
thought I express with "water quenches thirst", the content that water 
q uenches thirst. I may not know that those conditions do in fact obtain 
or, for that matter, what they are, but if I am reflexively aware of this 
thought and I express this reflexive awareness with, say, "I am hereby 
judging that water quenches thirst", the content of the that-clause of 
this reflexive attitude is that water quenches thirst, that is, it is the 
content of the first-order thought itself. But if a corresponding episode 
happens on Twin-Earth, the thought that my Twin expresses with "water 
quenches thirst" has the content that twin water (twater) quenches 
thirst, and this is also the content of the that-clause of my Twin's 
reflexive attitude. So, on the inclusion model, Cogito-like judgments are 
reliably true in that they are contextually self-verifying. In this sense, a 
subject can be said to have authoritative knowledge over his thoughts' 
content, in spite of these thoughts' having external individuation 
conditions which the subject has no privileged knowledge of. 
I think that the inclusion model is ultimately correct, but, as it 
stands, it is affected by some shortcomings . One problem is that it 
draws too heavily on an externalist, reliabilist view of justification (see, 
e. g., Bernecker 1998), for, on this model, justification of self-
ascriptions rests on the existence of a mechanism (which the subject 
need not have cognitive access to) ensuring that the content of first-
order thoughts is ipso facto included in self-ascriptions of those 
thoughts. This important reliabilist component links the inclusion 
model too closely to the fate of reliabilism itself. It also needs some 
more work of a general kind about the nature of external 
determination of meaning and content if it is to be able to meet the 
objections we are about to see. One major objection is that this model 
does not ensure what Boghossian has called the "transparency of 
content". I shall try to do part of the required additional work later m 
this paper. Let us now turn to Boghossian's objection. 
3. Transparency of content: switching between worlds. 
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Some philosophers feel that the inclusion model makes self-
knowledge into a rather anaemic cognitive achievement, so much so 
that its entitlement to the dignity of knowledge could be justifiably 
questioned. Paul Boghossian, for one, acknowledges that accounts of 
self-knowledge on the lines of the inclusion model ensure that, at least 
in basic cases, a subject's reports of his current thought contents will 
always be true (Boghossian 1992, p. 15), but he complains that such 
accounts do not ensure that these thought contents are transparent for 
him. Boghossian construes the notion of transparency of content on the 
basis of Dummett's concept of transparency of meaning. According to 
Dummett, "... meaning is transparent in the sense that, if someone 
attaches a meaning to each of two words, he must know whether these 
meanings are the same" (quoted from Boghossian 1992, p. 16). 
Correspondingly, content is transparent to a subject only if he is able to 
know in a direct, a priori way whether the contents of two thoughts of 
his are the same or not. Boghossian grounds his contention that the 
inclusion model does not grant transparency of content on thought 
experiments in which we are asked to imagine that a subject is 
unwittingly transported, say, from Earth to Twin Earth and remains 
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there for a fairly long time.4 Let's call our inter-world traveller "Peter". 
Boghossian writes: "How should we think about the semantics of Peter's 
thoughts? Well, one intuition that is shared by practically everyone who 
has thought about these cases is that, after a while (how long is 
unclear), tokens of 'water' in Peter's mentalese will cease to mean 
water and will come to mean twater" (Boghossian 1992, p. 18). This 
intuition coheres especially well, according to Boghossian, with the 
following principle of content fixation which underlies standard Twin 
Earth cases: "The contents of thought tokens of a given syntactic type 
are determined by whatever environmental property is the typical 
cause of the perceptions that cause and sustain tokens of that type" 
(Boghossian 1992, p. 19). I shall dispute later both the intuition and the 
principle, but let us provisionally grant them for the sake of the 
argument. Consequences of chis chought experiment for self-knowledge 
are quite clear. Suppose, in effect, that, while still on Earth, in summer, 
Peter is thirsty and fills a glass with cold water while muttering: "Water 
will quench my thirst". Some years later, a similar episode takes place 
on Twin Earth and Peter mutters tokens of the same words, while 
remembering the analogous occasion we have referred to. Since his 
subjective experience has not been disrupted and, for all he knows, he 
has not travelled to another world, he will certainly judge that the 
4 This sort of thought experiment had been already devised by Burge: see Burge 
1988, p. 652. 
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token thought contents he has expressed on both occasions are of the 
same type. But, if externalism is true, they are not. So, content is not 
transparent for him. His comparative judgment about his thought 
contents is false. On this basis, Boghossian contends that Burge's self-
verifying judgments do not amount to knowledge. He tries to show this 
as follows. Suppose that, after being on Twin Earth long enough, Peter is 
told that the switch has occurred, but not when it took place. We ask 
Peter: "Two years ago, were you thinking that water quenches thirst or 
that twater quenches thirst?" Peter will not know the answer. However, 
according to Burge's inclusion model, two years ago Peter knew what he 
was thinking in that he was able to reflexively self-ascribe a thought he 
expressed with the sentence "water quenches thirst". But now Peter 
acknowledges that he doesn't know what thought he was having two 
years ago. Why? According to Boghossian, there are two possible 
explanations: that Peter has forgotten or that he never knew. But 
memory failure should be excluded by stipulation, for "it is not as if 
thoughts with widely individuated contents might be easily known but 
difficult to remember. The only explanation, I venture to suggest, is not 
that he has forgotten but that he never knew. Burge's self-verifying 
judgments do not constitute genuine knowledge. What other reason is 
there for why our slowly transported thinker will not know tomorrow 
what he is said to know directly and authoritatively today?" 
(Boghossian 1989, p. 23). Therefore, externalism is not compatible 
with self-knowledge. This is, in rough terms, Boghossian's 
incompatibilist argument. 
4. Does self-knowledge include transparency of content? 
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One possible way of countering Boghossian's incompatibilist 
argument is to hold that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, 
ordinary self-knowledge does not include transparency of content. This 
thesis has been defended by Kevin Falvey and Joseph Owens.5 Falvey 
and Owens contend that, independently of externalism, we do not enjoy 
what they call "introspective knowledge of comparative content". I take 
this knowledge to be equivalent to Boghossian's transparency of 
content, for it is characterized as follows: "With respect to any two of 
his thoughts or beliefs, an individual can know authoritatively and 
directly (that is, without relying on inferences from his observed 
environment) whether or not they have the same content" (Falvey and 
Owens 1994, pp. 109-110; cf. also Owens 1995). They seem to endorse 
the inclusion model of self-knowledge, with its resulting self-verifying 
judgments, and, on this basis, they accept that we possess what they 
call "introspective knowledge of content", according to which "an 
individual knows the contents of his occurrent thoughts and beliefs 
authoritatively and directly (that is, without relying on inferences from 
observation of his environment)" (Falvey and Owens 1994, pp. 109-
110). 
Boghossian's objection is quite probably innocuous against 
introspective knowledge of content. So, an externalist might easily 
embrace compatibilism by limiting the scope of self-knowledge in this 
way. But I have the suspicion that this would be too cheap a victory 
against incompatibilism. For, on the one hand, Falvey and Owens defend 
his thesis that we do not enjoy comparative self-knowledge on the basis 
of examples involving pairs of synonymous and co-extensive terms (e. 
5 This view has also been defended by John Gibbons. See Gibbons 1996, p. 304. It is 
also present in Burge 1998. 
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g. 'physician' and 'doctor', or 'cilantro' and 'coriander') which a 
subject does not know to be so. But these examples seem to me 
controversial and capable of receiving quite natural interpretations 
which do not entail that a subject lacks comparative self-knowledge. 
Suppose, for instance, that Andrew thinks that the thought he expresses 
with the words "Mary is a physician" is not the same as the thought he 
expresses with "Mary is a doctor". Suppose he thinks so because he 
believes that 'physician' and 'doctor' are not synonyms (let us suppose 
that he thinks that 'physician' is synonymous with 'physicist'). Only 
from an implausibly crude externalist perspective would someone be 
inclined to think that the subject is wrong about his two thoughts' 
being different. I tend to hold that Andrew's two thoughts are in fact 
different, that he is right in believing that they are and, therefore, that 
he has comparative self-knowledge. And, on the other hand, 
Boghossian's transparency requirement for self-knowledge seems to be 
well grounded on a reasonable requirement (a necessary condition) for 
knowledge in general. This requirement might be called "the principle 
of relevant alternatives". According to this principle, a subject cannot 
be said to know that a is an F, though it in fact is, if, in case a were a G, 
where being a G is a relevant alternative to being an F, this subject 
would still judge that a is an F. Knowledge requires the ability to 
discriminate between relevant alternatives. So, imagine. to use the 
famous Putnamian example, that I cannot tell elms from beeches. Then, 
even if my judgments of the form "a is an elm" happen to be always 
true, I cannot be said to know that a is an elm, for, if a were a beech 
instead, where being a beech is a relevant alternative to being an elm, I 
would still judge that it was an elm. Note that this still holds even if I do 
not know about the existence of beeches. It is the existence of relevant 
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alternatives, not my belief or knowledge that there are, what matters 
here for possession of knowledge. Now Peter, the inter-world traveller, 
does not seem to satisfy this requirement. He cannot discriminate 
between his water-thoughts and his twater-thoughts and the latter are, 
for him, relevant alternatives to the former. He does not know about 
the existence of these relevant alternatives, but, as I said, this does not 
change matters. In terms of the inclusion model, Peter's judgments 
about his thought contents happen to be true. When Peter is on Earth 
and reflexively mutters "I am judging that water quenches thirst", this 
judgment is true, for it has the content that water quenches thirst, but 
Peter does not know that his thought has this content, for, if it had the 
content that twater quenches thirst instead, he still would think, 
mistakenly, that it had the same content it now has. 
This, if correct, restates Boghossian's incompatibilist argument 
against Falvey and Owens' response and makes things harder for 
compatibilists. They had better show that externalism is compatible 
with transparency of content if they want to show that it is compatible 
with self-knowledge. 
5. Incompatibilism and memory. 
Other attempts to meet Boghossian's objection focus on the role 
memory plays in his argument. Let us extend a bit on this part of the 
argument. Recall that Peter, the inter-world traveller, interpreted in the 
light of the inclusion model and its corresponding self-verifying 
judgments, knows at tl what he is thinking, but at t2, after being told 
about the switch, he does not know what he was thinking at tl. But 
Boghossian takes it to be a "platitude about memory and knowledge" 
that "if S knows that p at tl, and if at (some later time) t2, S 
I 3 
remembers everything he knew at t 1, then S knows that p at t2" 
(Boghossian 1989, p. 23). Now if S does not know that p at t2, then 
either he does not remember at t2 everything he knew at tl or he did 
not know that p at tl. If, by assumption, we rule out memory failure, it 
seems we have to conclude that S did not know that p at tl. Ludlow has 
given this useful reconstruction of this part of Boghossian's 
incompatibilist argument: "(l) If S forgets nothing, then what S knows 
at tl, S knows at t2, (2) S forgot nothing, (3) S does not know that P at 
t2; (4) therefore, S did not know that P at tl" (Ludlow 1995a, p. 157). 
That the 'platitude' Boghossian states (which corresponds to 
premise (1) in Ludlow's reconstruction) is indeed a platitude has been 
put into question by some authors, such as Ludlow (1995b) and 
Goldberg (1997). Goldberg's remarks are especially interesting from 
the perspective of the present paper, for they point to an element that 
seems to be an integral part of Boghossian's argument, namely the 
relevant alternatives account of knoweldge, rn order to undermine 
Boghossian's supposed platitude. According to Goldberg (who 
acknowledges his debt to Falvey on this point), "someone could know 
that p at tl, remember at 12 everything ::;he knew at tl , and yet fail to 
know that p at t2 -even if she continues to believe that p, and p is 
true- for the very familiar reason that there might be new evidence 
encountered along the way that points to a relevant alternative she 
cannot exclude" (Goldberg 1997, p. 214). Brueckner (1997) has also 
questioned premise (1) on a similar basis. He writes: "To say that at t2, 
S has forgotten nothing that he knew at tl is to say that at t2, 
remembers everything that he knew at tl. But it does not follow that 
that at t2, S knows everything that he knew at tl. This is because for 
some P that he knew at t 1, he may remember at t2 that P while failing to 
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know at t2 that P, say, because of some defeating information that he 
has learned between tl and t2" (Brueckner 1997, p. 8). In Boghossian's 
example, Peter has acquired new information (namely that he has been 
switched at some unknown time) which defeats his justification for 
believing that at tl he was thinking that water quenches thirst. This, if 
correct, shows premise ( 1) to be false. 
Is Boghossian's incompatibilist argument thereby defeated? I do 
not think so, for the argument can be restated without any essential 
appeal to memory. The conclusion that Peter does not know at tl what 
he is thinking at tl, so that Burge's self-verifying judgments do not 
constitute knowledge, can be reached with no need of premise (1). 
Suppose, in effect, that Peter is told that he has suffered repeated 
switching between Earth and Twin Earth, but not when the switches 
took place nor where he is now. In these circumstances, he will 
recognize that he does not know, right now, what he is thinking right 
now, because he does not know whether he is thinking that water 
quenches thirst or that twater quenches thirst. 
The possibility that Boghossian's argument is restated without 
appealing to memory suggests that no criticism based on reflections on 
memory can aspire to a definitive rebuttal of Boghossian's 
incompatibilism. Goldberg has also tried to show that Boghossian's 
argument may dispose of an appeal to memory and be restated in terms 
of an ability to knowingly identify self-ascribed thoughts (Goldberg 
1997, p. 215). Both Goldberg's and my own restatement of 
Boghossian's incompatibilist contentions without appeal to memory 
make use of the notion of discrimination between thought contents, a 
notion closely related to that of transparency of content and to the 
relevant alternatives account of knowledge. I have argued in favour of 
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transparency of content as a necessary condition for self-knowledge in 
the previous section, against Falvey and Owens' denial of this condition. 
I want now to consider a possible objection to this condition, according 
to which it might seem implausibly strong to require of Peter, as far as 
he is fully unaware of his switching career, that he be able to knowingly 
identify his water-thoughts as water-thoughts and his twater-thoughts 
as twater-thoughts. This form of discrimination we might call "strong 
discrimination". I can agree that this requirement is too demanding. 
However, it is not implausible to require of Peter, if he is to have self-
knowledge, at least that he does not take his water-thoughts and his 
twater-thoughts to be of the same type. We might call this "weak 
discrimination". Now, Peter does not satisfy even the weak 
discrimination condition. If he is unaware of the switching, he will 
certainly judge that a water-thought he expresses with 'water quenches 
thirst' is of the same type as a twate r-thought he expresses with those 
same words, even if he is having those two thoughts in the specious 
present (provided both concepts are available to him). The inclusion 
model ensures that his self-ascriptions are true, but not, if the weak 
discrimination condition is correct, that they amount to knowledge. 
In a recent paper (Burge 1998),6 Burge has countered 
Boghossian's argument by distinguishing two ways in which memory 
can work, namely by discriminatory identification and by preservation. 
Preservative memory retains the content of past thinkings through 
causal links with them, preserving contents and attitudes without the 
subject's having to refer to or identify them, similarly to what happens 
with anaphoric uses of pronouns. So, by simply having a thought that 
6 Some central ideas in this paper relate closely to those Burge had developed in 
his 1993 paper. 
1 6 
Peter expresses with "I thought that water is wet", preservative memory, 
working properly, connects Peter's present thought to the remembered 
though, with the content and concepts that were in play at that earlier 
time. 
Burge holds, then, that discriminatory identification is not 
necessary in order to know what one is thinking. Besides, a strong 
reliabilist component is present in Burge's account of presevative 
memory, as is also in his understanding of present-tense self-
knowledge. These two aspects may undermine the force of his response 
to Boghossian, if either reliabilism were shown to be wrong or if the 
ability to discriminate between relevant alternatives were to be a 
necessary condition for knowledge. I have argued in favour of the latter 
above. Suppose that Peter, being very thirsty on Twin Earth, thinks to 
himself "water will quench my thirst" and self-ascribes this thought, 
while also thinking "I thought the same thing two years ago". It is hard 
to accept that in these conditions, where the comparative thought is 
supposedly false, his plain self-ascription amounts to knowledge. But 
then it is hard (and arbitrary) to accept that, in order to have self-
knowledge, the self-ascribed thought must not be accompanied by a 
corresponding comparative thought. 
It would be good, then, to have compatibilism even accepting the 
discrimination condition. And it would also be good if compatibilism 
did not depend on strong reliabilist assumptions. 
6. Switching cases: actual and possible. 
Another way of countering Boghossian's incompatibilist argument 
is to hold that the mere possibility of switching cases does not prove 
that we lack self-knowledge. Only actual switching cases would threaten 
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self-knowledge. Ted Warfield (1992) has taken this line of response. He 
summarizes Boghossian's argument as fo11ows (where "P" = "S's thought 
is about water" and "S" designates an individual in our world): 
"Pl. To know that P by introspection , S must be able to 
introspectively discriminate P from all relevant alternatives of P. 
P2. S cannot introspectively discriminate water thoughts from 
twater thoughts. 
P3. If the Switching case 1s actual , then twater thoughts are 
relevant alternatives of water thoughts. 
Cl. S doesn't know that P by introspection" (Warfield 1992, p. 
23 5) 
Warfield holds, correctly, that this argument is not valid. All that 
follows from premises Pl-P3 is the much weaker conclusion Cl': 
Cl'. If the Switching case is actual, then S doesn't know that P by 
introspection. 
In order to obtain Cl an additional premise, P*, would be needed: 
P*. The Switching case is actual. 
Boghossian's argument shows, at most, that, given externalism, it 
is not necessary that the contents of a subject's thoughts are knowable 
to him on the basis of introspection. 
In a different paper, Warfield gives the following informal 
summary of his response to Boghossian: "Boghossian argues that if 
externalism is true, an individual (called a Travel1er) who is somehow 
transported back and forth between Earth and Twin Earth will not know 
the content of the thought she expresses with the sentence 'Water 1s 
wet'. Leaving aside the question of whether or not Travellers can have 
knowledge of the contents of their 'water' thoughts , I show in my 
(1992) that Boghossian's argument shows at most that Travellers do 
not know the contents of their thoughts; it does not show that we do 
not know the contents of our thoughts because Boghossian has not 
argued that we are Travellers" (Warfield 1995, p. 540). 
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Peter Ludlow (1995a) has tried to reply to Warfield. According to 
Ludlow, premise (P3) in Warfield's reconstruction of Boghossian's 
argument is unnecessarily strong in stating the conditions under which 
there are relevant alternatives to water thoughts. A weaker premise like 
(P3') would do as well: 
(P3') If switching cases m general are prevalent, then there are 
relevant alternatives of water thoughts. 
In order to show that (P3') is sufficient, Ludlow offers the 
following analogy. Suppose that counterfeit is frequent at coin shows. 
Thus, even if there is no counterfeit at a particular coin show, a subject 
cannot be said to know that a certain coin is authentic if he is not able 
to discriminate it from a false replica. The alternative that a particular 
coin is false is relevant even if, as it may happen, there are no false 
coins in this particular context. 
But if (P3') is the right premise, then a premise weaker than P* 
would be sufficient to establish Boghossian's incompatibility Lhesis, 
something like (P**): 
(P**) Switching cases, rn general, are prevalent. 
He tries to show that this premise is true by construing a Burge-
style case in which a subject, Biff, moves back and forth between 
communities largely overlapped with respect to language (namely 
British English and American English speaking communities). Biff uses 
the term 'chicory' deferring successively to each community without 
noticing that this term has a different meaning in each. So, when Biff 
has a thought involving that term in England he is thinking one thing, 
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but when a similar episode takes place m the United States, he is 
thinking something different. However, he does not know that he is 
having different thoughts. In order to substantiate (P**), Ludlow 
generalizes Biff's case by saying that "we routinely move between social 
groups and institutions, and in many cases shifts in the content of our 
thoughts will not be detected by us. (There is, it appears, a little of Biff 
m all of us)" (Ludlow l 995a, p. 48). 
It is worth noting that, if the proposal we are going to make below 
is correct, externalism does not necessarily entail the consequence 
Ludlow wants to draw from this example. But let us grant provisionally 
this consequence for the sake of the argument. In my opinion, 
Warfield's requirement that Switching cases be actual is misguided, as, 
correspondingly, is Ludlow's attempt to defend Boghossian's argument 
by showing such cases to be prevalent. Warfield is probably right that, 
strictly speaking, Boghossian's argument does not establish that we 
actually lack self-knowledge. Only the actuality or at least the 
prevalence of Switching cases would have that general consequence. As 
Warfield points out, the right conclusion of Boghossian's argument is 
that, given externalism, it is possible that we lack self-knowledge. But 
this conclusion is devastating enough if we carefully reflect on what it 
involves. Since Switching situations are possible, whether or not they 
are actual or prevalent, and since subjects in those situations may be 
fully unaware that they are in them, Boghossian's argument does 
establish that, given externaHsm, self-knowledge is contingent on 
circumstances (such as an undetected change in our environment) we 
might not be aware or have any control of. Externalism entails the 
possibility of situations where a subject's being mistaken about the 
world leads to his being mistaken about what he is thinking. Owens 
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explicitly acknowledges this when he writes: "Because of her lack of 
information about the world a subject may have mistaken beliefs about 
her beliefs" (Owens 1995, p. 265). But this is unacceptable, whether or 
not we are victims of Switching cases. If externalism entails that we may 
lack self-knowledge owing to our being mistaken about the world, then 
externalism conceals the threat of an epistemological havoc, for we 
could not know what we believe before knowing that our beliefs about 
the world are true, but we could not know that our beliefs about the 
world are true without knowing what it is that we believe. This circle 
would lead to complete epistemological darkness . 
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7. Towards a reasonable compatibilisrn. 
In the following sections I will try to elaborate the makings of a 
reasonable form of compatibilism. My strategy will be to short-circuit 
Boghossian's argument at a much earlier stage than do the attempts we 
have been reviewing. The failure of those attempts, I suspect, is due to 
the fact that they concede too much to the incompatibil ist. I shall be 
questioning instead some assumptions that underlie Boghossian's 
argument and allow it to get off the ground. 
What makes us worry about self-knowledge, I contend, is not 
externalism as such, that is, the general doctrine that our thought 
contents and concepts are individuated, in part, by external factors, but 
rather a particular, though widely extended construal of this doctrine. 
This particular construal, which might be called "causal externalism", is 
explicitly assumed in Boghossian's incompatibilist argument as well as 
(sometimes implicitly) in the attempts to counter it we have seen so 
far, and is illegitimately identified with externalism as such. The core of 
this construal, in Boghossian's presentation of it, is the principle of 
content fixation we referred to above. To recall, the principle is as 
follows, in Boghossian's own words: " ... The contents of thought tokens 
of a given syntactic type are determined by whatever environmental 
property is the typical cause of the perceptions that cause and sustain 
tokens of that type" (Boghossian 1992, p. 19). Given this principle, a 
change in the typical causes of thought tokens of a given syntactic type 
will lead to a change in the content of those tokens. Now, since the 
change of typical causes may go undetected by a subject, as happens rn 
Switching cases, the change in his thought contents will also go 
undetected by him, hence (given some plausible discrimination 
condition) he will lack self-knowledge with respect to those thoughts . 
This construal of externalism cannot but fall prey to Switching cases 
arguments. But nothing forces us to accept this construal. In fact, I 
think we should reject it and turn to a different, more plausible 
construal. 
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Recall that, according to Boghossian, our intuition about the 
semantics of Switching cases is that, after an indeterminate period on a 
twin environment, tokens of 'water' in the Travellers' mentalese change 
their meamng, with a change in the content of the corresponding 
thought tokens (cf. Boghossian 1992, p. 18). I want to challenge that 
intuition. Intuitions, as we know, constitute a shaky, problematic 
domain. In many cases it is rather unclear whether they are really 
independent of previous theoretical commitments or are unwittingly 
fueled by these commitments themselves. I guess that the intuition 
Boghossian refers to is fed by a commitment to a causal construal of 
externalism, so it cannot be used to validate this construal. Another 
problem with this intuition is that it is raised by such extreme examples 
as transworld unwitting travelling cases, and it is doubtful that our 
conceptual background is fit enough to resist the strain and to yield 
clear verdicts when confronted with such extraordinary scenarios. A 
final point is that the intuition and the principle of content fixation 
that, according to Boghossian , accounts for it rest on the unwarranted 
attribution to environmental factors of an unexplained, unanalyzed 
and, let me say, sort of magical power to gradually influence and 
eventually change, after an indeterminate period of exposure to them, a 
Traveller's thought contents. 
Let me dispute the intuition and the principle that supposedly 
explains it by resorting to more mundane, more realistic switching 
cases, where a factor in a subject's environment changes without the 
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subject's noticing the change. For the reason given, our intuitions about 
these cases are likely to be more reliable than those raised by 
extraordinary stages and can be then extended to the latter. Think of 
the following case. Suppose I have been longing to possess a three 
carats diamond and that, after strenuous financial efforts, my dream 
comes finally true. A wonderful diamond shines now inside a glass case 
in my sitting room. It is clear that the term 'diamond' in my mental 
attitudes and verbal expressions of them up to now means diamond. 
Unfortunately, an expert thief gets in my house and replaces my 
diamond by a false replica, a zircon piece, which I cannot distinguish 
from my longed for diamond. From then on, paraphrasing Boghossian's 
principle of content fixation, the environmental property that is the 
typical cause of the perceptions that cause and sustain my tokens of 
the syntactic type 'diamond' (cf. Boghossian 1992, p. 19) is the 
property of being a zircon piece, not the property of being a diamond. 
But do we really have the intuition that, after an indeterminate while, 
my tokens of 'diamond' have come to mean zircon? I definitely think 
we don't. My tokens of 'diamond' continue to mean diamond and I 
know they do. This Switching case has, no doubt, epistemological 
consequences, but these consequences do not affect self-knowledge. 
My belief that I possess a diamond is now false, as well as my belief that 
my desire to possess a diamond is now satisfied, but no doubt I know 
what these beliefs and desires are. If Boghossian's principle of content 
fixation were correct, my beliefs would now be true and my desire 
would be satisfied, for their content would have come to be about 
zircon, but this is surely wrong. My tokens of 'diamond' still mean 
diamond despite their being now typically caused by zircon. 
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A possible objection to this examp1e7 is that it differs in some 
important respects from the Switching examples that motivate 
Boghossian's argument. In particular, it might be held that, rn my 
example, what might be keeping the meaning of 'diamond' constant is 
the continuity of the social community to which the subject defers and 
in which 'diamond' means diamond. In order to meet this objection, we 
can try to construe a case where the shift also affects the social 
community. One problem with this attempt is that the example 
becomes less realistic and the intuitions it raises might correspondingly 
be less reliable. Anyway, I will try to make the example as realistic as 
possible. Imagine, then, that the theft occurs shortly after I have moved 
to another country where still English is spoken, with the only 
difference, which I do not know about, that members of the new 
community use 'diamond' to mean what in the original community was 
meant by 'zircon' and conversely. Does this imply, given Burge's social 
externalism, that after living in the new community long enough the 
thoughts I express with tokens of 'diamond' turn into thoughts about 
zircon? Think that the experts of the new community, if they were to 
examine the mineral, would assenl to my utcerance "I possess a nice 
diamond" (though they might be slightly surprised to find that I am so 
proud of my zircon). Though this case is a bit more complicated, my 
intuition is definitely that my tokens of 'diamond' still mean diamond, 
not zircon. With 'diamond' I do not want to unconditionally mean 
whatever it is that my new community (or its experts) mean by 
'diamond'; I only intend to mean that under the assumption that what 
they mean by 'diamond' is the same as that which is meant by that 
word in my original community. Since this assumption is false, I still 
7 I owe this objection to Andreas Kemmerling. 
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defer to my old community for what concerns the meamng of 
'diamond'. The original community keeps its preemmence over the new 
one. To see this, suppose that I get to know about the semantic 
difference. From then on, I would certainly tell members of my new 
community that I possess a wonderful zircon (provided I am still 
ignorant of the theft), thus changing the word to preserve the meaning. 
And I would be sadly surprised to be told that what I possess is a 
diamond, not a zircon, as sadly surprised, in fact, as if in my original 
community I had been told that I possess a zircon and not a diamond. 
This speaks clearly, I think, in favour of the view that, while ignorant of 
the semantic difference, the meaning of my tokens of 'diamond' has 
not shifted, nor has the content of the thoughts I express with tokens of 
that word. This intuition is consistent with Burge's stress on the 
importance of social communities m fixing thought contents; it only 
requires to accept that deference to the actual community one happens 
to live in need not be unconditional: a subject may defer to a different 
community, especially if this is the community where he grew up. 
My suggestion is that something similar would apply to the case of 
our hero Peter, the inter-world traveller. Peter's tokens of 'water' on 
Twin Earth continue to mean water, in spite of their being now typically 
caused by twater. In view of our modified example, it will not do to say 
that, after staying on Twin Earth long enough, Peter's deference to the 
Twin Earthian community makes his tokens of 'water' mean twater. 
Peter is only deferent to his new community under the assumption that 
this community is that in which he learned language and its meaning. 
Since this assumption is not true, Peter still defers to his original 
Earthian community, and his tokens of 'water' still mean water. 
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8. Normative exlernalism. 
Let me now try to explain the intuitions about realistic switching 
cases. Someone might be tempted to think that the only possible 
theoretical explanation of them is internalism. If this were so, then 
compatibilism would have lost the battle. But this is not so. A plausible 
externalist view of meaning and content fixation can also account for 
them. Let me call the construal of externalism I favour "normative 
externalism" .8 We can contrast normative externalism and causal 
externalism by noticing their respective answers to the following 
question: Why do tokens of 'water' mean water on Earth and twater on 
Twin Earth? The answer of causal externalism is, roughly, as follows: 
because Earthians' tokens of 'water' are typically caused by water, while 
Twin Earthians' tokens of 'water' are typically caused by twater. It is 
clear how this conception leaves open the possibility of Switching 
cases. According to normative externalism, in turn, the answer would 
be: because Earthians learn and teach the meaning of 'water' in 
connection with paradigmatic samples of water, while Twin Earthians 
learn and teach the meaning of 'water' in connection with samples of a 
different substance, namely twater. On this conslrual of externalism, 
our words' meaning depends on external conditions because certain 
bits of the external world are used as samples in order to define those 
words, to give those words their meaning. The external sample becomes 
a norm for a correct use of the word. So, suppose that, in using certain 
words in thought and talk, we implicitly rely on the paradigmatic 
samples in connection with which we learned the meaning of those 
words and that we defer, unless we have positive reasons for doing 
8 Nenad Miscevic suggested to me the label "definitional externalism" for my 
position. His reasons will be apparent from what follows. Nothing really 
substantial hinges on the label, but I still prefer "normative externalism". 
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otherwise, to the original community where we learned that meaning. 
This would allow for a high degree of constancy in our words' meaning 
and in the thoughts we express with them, a constancy they would not 
have if meaning depended just on the typical causes of tokenings of 
those words. 
It seems clear to me that this construal of externalism is 
consistent with Burge's social externalism. In fact, given the emphasis it 
puts on the social interaction involved in the process of language 
learning and teaching, this construal is much easier to square with 
Burge's insights than the causal construal. Besides, normative 
externalism is not really far from Putnam's conception either. Remarks 
about paradigmatic samples can also be found in Putnam's "The 
meaning of 'meaning"'. Normative externa1ism and causal 
externalism, unlike internalism, can account for our intuitions about 
Putnam's original Twin Earth thought experiments. But normative 
externalism and internalism, unlike causal externalism, explain our 
intuitions about realistic Switching cases. So, only normative 
externalism can account for both groups of intuitions, which clearly 
speaks in its favour. It explains why we tend to judge that tokens of 
'diamond' do not come to mean zircon after being, from a certain 
moment on, typically caused by zircon. The meaning of 'diamond' is 
not fixed by typical causes of tokenings of that word, but by 
paradigmatic samples of diamonds, and this is why a change m those 
typical causes does not affect the word's meaning. 
If we extend our intuitions about realistic cases to more extreme, 
inter-world switching cases, something quite similar can be said about 
Peter. Peter learnt the meaning of 'water' on Earth in connection with 
samples of water, so that, with respect to this meaning, he defers to the 
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real nature of these samples (and to the Earthian community where 
they are used) in tokening the word in speech or in thought. Since, 
after his unwitting travelling to Twin Earth, no new process of learning 
takes place, his tokenings of the word retain their Earthian meaning. 
They still mean water, in spite of their being now typically caused by 
twater. Consequences of all this for self-knowledge should be clear by 
now. Peter retains his introspective knowledge of comparative content; 
his thought contents are, in Boghossian's terms, transparent for him. 
Peter's judgment is that the thought he expresses, when he is on Twin 
Earth, in tokening the sentence "water quenches thirst" has the same 
content as the thought he expressed on Earth, some time ago, by 
tokening that sentence. According to causal externalism, Peter is wrong 
on this account. But according to normative externalism, he is right. 
Some of Peter's beliefs are now false on Twin Earth, but his beliefs, even 
comparative, about the contents of those beliefs are still true. If all this 
is correct, the inclusion model of self-knowledge, completed with a 
normative construal of externalism, can successfully meet the 
Switching cases objection to compatibilism. 
My proposal can temperate the crude externalist reliabilism which 
underlies the inclusion model, thus making the latter less vulnerable to 
shortcomings of the former. I think it is correct to say that self-
ascriptions include the content of the first-order thought, but on my 
account this content does not get fixed m complete independence of 
the subject's intentions to keep faithful to certain content-giving 
practices and definitions. The real nature of water, for example, 
contributes to the meaning of 'water', as does in the causal version of 
externalism, but not outside a social interaction frame in which the 
subject who uses the word is knowingly involved. This allows my 
proposal to prevent a mere shift in the causal (or even social) 
environment from automatically producing a shift in meaning and 
content. 
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It might be objected that, according to my account, if Peter's 
unwitting travel to Twin Earth takes place while he is still learning the 
meaning of 'water', so that this learning continues on Twin Earth, his 
term 'water' will come to mean water-or-twater. I accept this. But I do 
not think it is a problem for my account, for something similar would 
have happened on Earth if water had turned out to be a collection of 
different substances, as is the case, e. g., with jade. Peter would retain 
comparative self-knowledge. I conclude, then, that, at least for what 
concerns the Switching cases objection, externalism, on a normative 
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